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THE "DECENT PUBLIC BURIAL"* OF THE
DOCTRINE OF PATENT LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
The congressional power to create a patent system is derived
from Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution which au-
thorizes Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." This
clause has been interpreted as endowing Congress with the authority
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
written works and discoveries. Congress has fulfilled this constitutional
mandate by granting inventors a 17-year monopoly on the manufacture
of their discoveries.' In order to capitalize on this limited monopoly,
however, many inventors lacking capital contract with an established
company granting it a license to utilize the new discovery in the manu-
facture of products. In return, the inventor receives a royalty on each
such product produced or sold. In contract litigation concerning these
patent-licensing agreements, frequent challenges by the licensee of the
validity of the patent gave birth to the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
The doctrine, as first enunciated in Kinsman v. Parkhurst,' pro-
vides that a patent licensee is estopped from challenging the validity
of the patent under which he holds the license. For over 100 years the
doctrine was variously applied, resulting in confusion and conflict among
the courts. This judicial disharmony was recently resolved however,
when the United States Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins' rejected
the doctrine as being corrosive of the strong federal policy favoring the
free competition of ideas. Thus, a licensee is no longer estopped from
challenging the validity of the patent under which he is licensed. This
comment will examine the reasoning behind the Lear case in the context
of the history of the doctrine, and present some of the reasoning ad-
vanced over the past 114 years, both in favor of, and contrary to, licensee
estoppel. In addition, the current patent policy considerations of the
Court will be presented.
I. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins
In 1951 the respondent, John Adkins, an inventor and mechanical
engineer, accepted a position with the petitioner, Lear, Inc., a man-
* Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947), vigorously endorsed the doctrine of licensee estoppel. He also
objected to the Court's slow erosion, as opposed to a single but complete abolition, of
the doctrine. "If a doctrine that was vital law for more than ninety years will be found
to have now been deprived of life, we ought at least to give it decent public burial." Id.
at 416.
1 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
2 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).
a 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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ufacturer of aviation equipMerit. A speCial caiditiciii of Adkins' em-
ployment was established in a rudimentary one-page employment
contract which provided that all "vertical gyros become the property
of Mr. John S. Adkins."4 The contract further provided that Adkins
would exthisiVely license Lear as manufacturer of any new vertical
gyroscopes Whidi resulted from his ekperimentation in the field. hi
1952 Mt. Adkins developed a more accurate and less expensive gyro-
scope essential to the advariCerherit of jet aircraft technology. Lear
adopted AdkiriS' ideas and commenced the rnanufattiite of gyroscopeS
based on his concepts. Simultaneously the inventor applied for a
patent. In 1955 Adkiha entered into an agreement with Lear sub-
stantially the same as their original one, but with considerably more
idetail, and specitying the royalties that the inventor was to receive.
After the Patent Office had twice rejected Adkins' applications, Lear
announced in 1957 that it would no lOnget pay royalties (because Leat
concluded, as a result of its own examination of the prior art, that
Adkins' ideas were unpatentable) and in 1959 ceased to pay royalties.
In IWO the Patent Office issued Adkins a patent on his amended
application. Adkins immediately brought suit for accrued royalties
and argued that Lear, under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, could
not challenge the validity of his patent.
In the California Superior CoUrt the jury found for Adkins and
awarded substantial damages. The trial judge, however, granted Lear's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in regard to royalties
on some of the gyroscopes.' The California Court of Appeals held
that Lear was within its contractual rights in terminating its royalty
Obligation and thus did not have to pay post-1959 royalties.° The
California Supteme Court rejected the intermediate court's conclusion
that Lear had repudiated the licensing agreement ;
 since Lear was still
manufacturing Adkins' gyroscopeS. Holding that the contract was still
in effect, the supreme court found that the doctrine of licensee estoppel
barred Lear from challenging the validity of the patent, and conse-
quently reinstated the jury verdict
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ulti -
mately reversed the decision and remanded the case to the California
Supreme Court. The Cotirt held that a patent licensee is not estopped
from challenging the validity of the patent under which he is licensed.
In so doing the Court specifically overruled Automatic Radio Mfg. Co.
4
 Id. at 657. It should be noted that this contract is contrary to the more common
employer-empIoyee agreements covering such matters. In the usual case, as a condition
of employment the employer stipulates that all ideas; discoveries, inventions, whether
Patentable or not; that are the result of such employment, become the exclusive property
of the employer, and upon termination of employment the employee cannot take with
him any of the ideas, discoveries, or inventions including the "knowlhoVv" that the
employee has acquired during his period of employment.
5 Id. at 660.
6 52 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
7 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
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v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,' which held the doctrine of licensee estoppel
to be the "general rule."°
The Lear decision was based upon the Court's determination that
the doctrine of licensee estoppel violated the strong federal policy
favoring the free competition of ideas." The public interest in the
free competition of ideas was believed to outweigh the requirements of
contract law' and the equities of the patent-licensor. Furthermore, the
Court indicated that the doctrine had been all but completely emas-
culated until the decision in Automatic Radio. The Court reasoned that
it is not inequitable to require the patent-licensor to defend his
patent when the licensee places the question in issue, because the is-
suance of a patent is based upon a factual determination of the Patent
Office, arrived at in an ex parte proceeding without the aid of argu-
ment. In addition, the Court noted the advantage to the patent owner
of the presumption of validity raised by the patent," and also ratio-
nalized that the licensee may be the only one with the economic incen-
tive to challenge patentability.
II. THE HISTORY OF LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
The immediate significance of Lear is that it ends the 114 years
of judicial confusion surrounding licensee estoppel. Of more lasting
importance, however, is the patent policy determination made by the
Court in this case. To fully appreciate the policy espoused by the
Lear case, the history of licensee estoppel from Kinsman through Lear
must be analyzed.
In Kinsman v. Parkhurst" the United States Supreme Court held
that a patent licensee was estopped from challenging the validity of
the patent under which he held the license. The Court reasoned that
since the licensee had received profits under the licensing agreement,
and had been unable to show how he was affected by the invalidity
of the patent, the validity was immaterial and he was estopped from
challenging it." The Court analogized the situation to an agent who
has collected a debt for his principal, and observed that the licensee
has no more right to deny the patent-licensor his royalties by alleg-
ing patent invalidity than does the agent to deny the principal the
amount collected by alleging that the debt was unjustly due." In anal-
ogizing the doctrine to the agent-principal relationship the court
8 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
9
 Id. at 836.
10
 The Court had previously expressed this federal policy in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
11
 Presumably, traditional contract principles would require the enforcement of the
agreement on the basis of the benefit received by Lear, regardless of the underlying patent
validity. 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 127 (1963).
12 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).
13 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).
19 Id, at 293.
15 Id.
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created some confusion, as it is generally accepted that licensee estop-
pel is based upon principles borrowed from the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship in property law."a More specifically, in an action by the
landlord for rent owed, the tenant cannot challenge the landlord's title
to the property as a defense.
The cases decided after Kinsman exemplify the confusion sur-
rounding the doctrine. In general the cases which rejected licensee estop-
pel assumed that a patent monopoly is a privilege and not a right, and
that the disclosure of invalid patents is in the public interest. On the
other hand, the cases which upheld the doctrine did so on the basis
that the 17-year patent monopoly is essential to provide the incentive
necessary for the continuous development of novel ideas, and that sub-
version of this limited monopoly is to be avoided. Underlying both
concepts is the clear public interest in generating new and useful ideas.
Thus, in licensee estoppel cases the central question facing the courts
has been, by what means is the public interest most satisfactorily
advanced.
The cases discussed below illustrate that courts' answers to this
question generally have not been in agreement. Kinsman, which estab-
lished the doctrine, was followed by Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co.," where
the Court stated that the licensee had to overcome a very strong pre-
sumption of patent validity to avoid paying royalties. Eighteen years
later, in Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt," the Court again gave implicit
support to the doctrine when it affirmed a decision of a New York
state court invoking licensee estoppel on the grounds that it involved
state law. In two later cases, United States v. Harvey Steel Co." and
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,' the Court
firmly embraced and applied the doctrine of licensee estoppel. The
policy underlying these cases is compatible with the policy of the
patent laws to protect the inventor unless the intention to contract
away his rights is expressly and unequivocally found. 21 The Court's
application of the doctrine as early as 1855 in Kinsman and as late as
1950 in Automatic Radio is misleading, however, since the development
and application of licensee estoppel clearly was not consistent. Decisions
of the Supreme Court following Kinsman, Eureka, and Dale Tile, tended
to discredit the doctrine and forewarned of the later confusion and con-
flict. For example, in St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling,' the Court did
not question the lower court's admission and examination of the licen-
10
 Treece, Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 525,
526 (1967) ; 44 Harv. L. Rev. 135 (1930) ; Clark v. Adie, 2 App. Cas. 423, 435-36 (G.B.
1877).
17 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 488, 491-92 (1870).
18 125 U.S. 46 (1888),
19
 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
20 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
21 Note, Rights of an Employer in Patents Obtained by His Employee, 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 468 (1922).
22
 140 U.S. 184 (1891). The Court noted in Lear that this decision has often been
erroneously interpreted as supporting the doctrine of licensee estoppel. 395 U.S. at 659.
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see's evidence questioning the novelty and patentability of the inven-
tion, and refused to reverse the determination of patent validity. One
year later the Court went even further, in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 2'
and found the licensee estoppel concept so inequitable that it refused
to grant an injunction to enforce a clause within the licensing agree-
ment in which the licensee promised never to contest the validity of
the patent. The Court said that challenging the validity was not a pri-
vate right of the individual, but one derived from the public policy to
promote the challenging of invalid patents. The Court noted that it was
as important to the public to keep competition unrepressed by worth-
less patents, as it was to protect the inventor of a truly valuable
invention.24
During the period between Harvey Steel (1905) and Automatic
Radio (1950) and leading up to the decision in Lear the doctrine of
licensee estoppel was frequently challenged and slowly eroded. In
Westinghouse 'Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.,25 the
Court imposed a limitation on the doctrine by stating that, although an
individual could not directly attack the validity of a patent, he could
introduce evidence to narrow the claim made in the patent. In St. Paul,
Pope, and Westinghouse, the Court took a cautious approach to the
doctrine, apparently seeking to circumvent it and avoid direct confron-
tation. That approach was soon abandoned, however, and the Court
began carving out significant exceptions to the doctrine.
In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co.," the Court examined
licensee estoppel more closely, saying that where a license agreement
includes a provision which, absent a valid patent (itself an exception
to the antitrust laws) would be in restraint of trade (here price-fixing),
licensee estoppel could not be used to preclude an investigation into
the validity of a patent. Likewise in Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago
Metallic Mfg. Co.27 and MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co.,28 the licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of
the patent where the licensing agreement contained a price-fixing
clause. The Court noted that the licensee is often the party in the best
position to promote the public interest by showing the invalidity of
the licensed patent. 29
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co." was another case
in which a patent licensing agreement was found to have violated the
policies of the patent and antitrust laws. The Court refused to enforce
the agreement which sought to extend the usual monopolistic patent
rights beyond their legitimate scope by including a "tie-in" clause. In
23 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
21 Id. at 234.
25 266 U.S. 342, 351 (1924).
26 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942).
27 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
28 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
29 Id. at 401.
38 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.0 the Court established yet an,
other exception to the doctrine, and rejected licenses granted under
pending patent applications wherein the licensee agreed, on granting of
the patent, not to contest its validity. There, the Court, finding licensee
estoppel contrary to the policy of the patent laws, did not bar the defend-
ant in an infringement suit from defending on the grounds that the
infringing device was prior-art and an expired patent. Thus, in a number
of cases in which the licensing agreement contained clauses which would
result in the misuse of patent rights, and which would be contrary
to patent and antitrust laws and policy, the doctrine of licensee estop,
pel was not invoked.
Despite this gradual decay, the doctrine suddenly was given new
vitality in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.'
The case held that " [t] he general rule is that the licensee under a
patent license agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed
patent in a suit for royalties due under the contract. . . . The general
rule applies and petitioner may not, in this suit, challenge the validity
of the licensed patents."" The Court unquestioningly accepted the
doctrine of licensee estoppel as the "general rule" in the closing para-
graph of its opinion without stating any reasons for so doing. The
Court did, however, attempt to distinguish the case from the Solo,
Katzinger, MacGregor, Mercoid, and Scott decisions, which were based
on either patent misuse or contravention of public policy, and stated
that " [t]here is no showing that the licensing agreement here or the
practices under it were a misuse of patents or contrary to public
policy."34
Automatic Radio added more doubt to the already uncertain
status of the doctrine, as the Court seemed to ignore the holdings of
previous cases rendered since Harvey, wherein exceptions to the doctrine
were created, thus permitting judicial scrutiny into the validity of the
patent. Although the trend in Supreme Court decisions had been to
limit the scope of the doctrine, the Automatic Radio case was an excep-
tion to the trend and tended to expand the rights of the patent-licen,
sor."
Though the doctrine of licensee estoppel was not an issue, its
foundation was again weakened in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co." and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.," where the Court
enunciated the strong federal policy favoring free competition of ideas.
Using similar reasoning the Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co." condemned
as unlawful the forced payments of royalties beyond the expiration
date of the patent. The Court reasoned that to enforce such an agree-
31 326 U.S, 249 (1945) .
32 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
33 Id. at 836.
34
36
 17 Brooklyn L. Rev. 155, 158 (1951).
se 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
37 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
38 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
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nient beti-iveen the parties Would effettiVely ektend the pateht hick -kip*
beyond the 17-year limit froth the date Of issuance, and thus contra=
verse the federal policy recognized in Sears and COMM.
In LCar the ambiguity surrounding the dOctrine was finally re=
SolVed. The Court stated: "We are satisfied that Automatic Radio ,
Manufacturing CO. v. Hakatiné Research, . . . itself the product
of a clouded histOry, shoUld no longer be regarded as sound laW with
respect to its `estoppel' holding, and that holding is now oVerruled."' °
ThilS, the Court held that Lear, the licenSee, must be allowed to raise
the question of patent validity:
When confronted with the conflicting demands of contract laW
and federal patent law ; the Supreine Court sought to develop an inter-
mediate pOSition. However, rather than a realistic comprorriise there
has been continuing confusion and inconsistency in the decisions. 40 The
state courts and lower federal courts were likewise unable to resolve the
conflicting claims. 41 The conflicting viewpoints, thOUgh not reSolVed,
have been silenced by the decision in Lëizr, but an examination of the
policy argutnentS that fostered more than 100 years of ambiguity will
reveal the current patent policy considerations of the Court.
III. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
Although Many Varied arguments have been advanced justifying
the existence of the doCtrine of licensee estoppel, these argUthents,
Which tend to be related and to overlap, fall into three general areas:
(1) preservation of the dOdtrine to foster the development of the arts;
(2) proteCtion of the basic principles of the laW Of contracts; and (3)
prevention of the Undesirable tonSeqUenceS resulting froth the licensing
Of ideas as trade secrets.
The doctrine haS beeh considered essential to the promotion and
enforcement of the pciiity of the patent clause of the Constitution, that
as 395 U.S. at 671.
40 Id. at 668
41 The following courts haVe recOgnized the doctrine Of licensee estoppel: Bowers
Mfg. CO. v. All-Steel Eduip.; Inc., 275 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
812 (1960) ; Hall Laboratories, Inc. v. National AluMinate Corp., 244 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956) ; Buckingham Prods. Co. v. McAleer Mfg. Co:,
108 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal OH Prods. Co.,
22 Del. Ch. 333, 2 A.2d 138 (1938). The following courts have not recognized the doctrine
of licensee estoppel: Clapper v. Original TraCtor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616, 629 (7th Cir.
1959) ; National Transformer Corp; v. France Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 343; 361-62 (6th Cir.
1954) ; Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Publication Corp., 166 F.2d 615, 618 (7th
Cir. 1948) ; Viki Hosiery Corp. v. Margulies, 164 F. SupP. 738, 740 (ED. Pa. 1958) ;
Pleatmaster, Inc. v. Consolidated Trimming Corp., 156 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ;
Crew v. Flanagan, 242 Minn. 549, 558, 65 N.W.2d 878, 884 (1954). Elgin Nat'l Watch CO.
v. Bulova Watch Co., 281 App. Div. 219, 118 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1953), illustrates one of the
ruin seqUituri created by the doctrine. This case held that "where the licenSee clOes not
use the invention, invalidity; of the Patent is not a defense to a Suit for minimum royal-
ties." The implication is that if the licensee had used or manufactured the patented
article, he would have been permitted to raise invalidity of the patent as a defense: This
would induce production solely to escape liability for minimum royalties—such manu-
facture could be wasteful and economically unsound.
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is, to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. That policy
is frustrated when men of ability who have employed their time in this
manner for the benefit of the community are deprived of the reward
for their ingenuity and labor.42 The public is benefitted—even if the
royalties paid to the patentee-licensor are reflected in increased prices
paid by the public for the product—because there is made available, for
a reasonable price, a product which it otherwise would not have. Fur-
thermore, without the doctrine the system of licensing patents would be
seriously impaired because the inventor would not know until after long
and costly litigation whether he could collect his agreed-upon royalties
from the licensor.
The possible consequences of the impairment of the patent licens-
ing system by the abolishment of the doctrine of licensee estoppel
could be detrimental to the patent-licensor and, less directly, to the
public. Abolition would tend to defeat the patent policy favoring the
promotion of free enterprise and the free competition of ideas, and
would not only discourage inventors from attempting to discover new
and useful ideas, but also negatively affect the quality of inventions
by diminishing the protection provided the inventor's limited monopoly
by patent estoppel.
Loss of this protection also adversely affects the bargaining posi-
tion of the patent-licensor. That is to say, the Supreme Court in
Lear has effectively removed one aspect implicit in the licensee-licensor
bargaining relationship—the inability of the licensee to challenge the
validity of the licensor 's patent. Hence, as a result of Lear the inventor
may now demand higher royalties to compensate for the risk that
invalidity of the patent might defeat the licensing agreement. Or the
licensor may demand a clause in the agreement providing that, should
the licensee challenge the validity of the patent and lose, he would
compensate the licensor for attorney's fees and other legal costs. With-
out the doctrine such a clause would be necessary because every licensee
or assignee unsatisfied with his license agreement would be tempted
to challenge the validity of the patent to void the agreement.
Another argument advanced to justify the doctrine of licensee
estoppel is that it is consistent with basic principles of contract law.
It has been stated that contract law is to be applied to patent agree-
ments:
Patent licenses have no statutory basis and rights under them
arise from contract rather than from the fact that patent
rights are involved; whatever rights parties have under a
license contract arise from the contract.°
Patent agreements include licenses "under patents that may issue on
the application .... "" There is a public policy favoring the enforcement
of contracts, and maintenance of the doctrine of licensee estoppel is
42
 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 673, 221 P.2d 73, 84 (1950)
(dissenting opinion).
48
 A. DeIler, Walker on Patents § 380 (2d ed. 1965).
44 Id. § 415.
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necessary to uphold and preserve this policy and the stability of con-
tracts. Under ordinary contract principles the fact that some benefit
is received from the contract is enough to require its enforcement,
regardless of the validity of the underlying patent. 45 Thus, it has been
concluded that "[a] s long as the licensee continues to enjoy the benefit
of the exclusive right, he must pay the royalty which he promised
to pay, and he cannot escape from so doing by offering to prove the
patent to be void.""
If a potential licensee desires to obtain a license for a patent he
must deal directly with the patentee, in which case, through negotia-
tions, the licensee gets exactly what he bargains for—the right to use
the invention. There is no warranty of validity of the patent implied
in any license given thereunder, and a licensee may not dispute the
validity of the patent in a suit for royalties. 47
 In the Lear case the
licensee took a known risk. Lear agreed to pay royalties on an inven-
tion that it knew had not been patented. Moreover, Lear had no reason
to believe that the doctrine of licensee estoppel, being the "general
rule," was not still in full force and effect. In addition, as there was
no agreement not to manufacture, there was no reason for Lear to
conclude that its license agreement with Adkins qualified under one
of the restraint of trade exceptions to the general rule carved out
in Sala, Katzinger, MacGregor, or Scott. Furthermore, the agree-
ment to pay royalties on a valid patent (and there is a presumption
of validity)" if the licensee manufactured clearly would not have been
a restraint of trade. Thus, knowledgeable of all the risks, and with
the same degree of freedom to contract as Adkins, Lear entered into
a contract, perhaps waiving its rights to contest these issues, but at
least, under any doctrine of estoppel, not retaining the ability to re-
pudiate the contract at will. Viewed in the context of the Lear case,
the argument that retaining the doctrine of licensee estoppel is re-
quired to promote the basic public interest in maintaining the stability
of contracts is persuasive. Thus, without the doctrine of licensee
estoppel it may be argued that fundamental reliance by the parties
is not possible in patent agreements.
The third reason for preserving the licensee estoppel doctrine is
that its abolition may so weaken the patent licensing system as to
encourage the use of the alternative protective device of licensing
discoveries as trade secrets. A trade secret is a secret formula or
process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it 4 9
This alternative method of licensing seriously conflicts with the policy
behind the patent system of encouraging new discoveries and ideas,
and making them available to the public. The licensing of trade secrets
45
 Id. § 403.
46 Id.
47 Id.
46 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).
45
 United States ex rd. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff
Comm., 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
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tends to abrogate the policy by expressly denying such information to
the public.
The la* protects, as being, a form of private property, ideas
developed out of individual initiative and imagination. 50 The California
Supreme Court in Desny v. Wi1(1051  quoted as an "accurate statement
Of the law" Mr. Justice BiandeiS' Statement that "[a]n essential
Ofeineht of individual prop erty is the legal right to exclude others ftoM
enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of ektIusibli may be
absoltite . . ."52 Thus it has been established that idea§ are indiVidual
property and may be excluded froth the pUblic khci*ledge. However,
the question remains whether they may be the subject of a liCensing
agreethent or carat-att. The Cowl in at least one jurisdiction has stated
that "an idea,, if valuable, may be the subject of contract . . . .""
Nevertheless, there are persuasiVe reasons for holding to the contrary.
For example, agreements and contracts which tend to create mohop-
Olies are illegal, and it is immaterial whether the monopolistic effect
is achieved implicitly or explicitly." Even if the agreement or con=
tract does not violate a specifiC antitrust law, courts of equity may
teftise to enforce the agreement or contract if it restrains competition
contrary to the pnblit interest." Furthermore, in United States v.
Besser Mfg. Co.," the district court held that the provisions Of a patent
licensing agreement gave the defendants the power to restrain cern ,
Petition and were intended to eliminate CoMpetition, and therefore
the agreeinent was illegal. It may be argued that Besser is authority
for the position that contracts involving trade secrets iii restraint of
trade alsó should be prohibited on the baSiS that the degree Of publit
interest involved in both situations is equal, and that presei-Vation of
thè stability of a trade secret contract would not seem to Outweigh
that of a patent agreement. Thus, while trade secret agteethents are
hOt per Se illegal, it is clear that there is a strong countervailing
The Court in Lear raised this question and intimated that there
are some doubts as to the acceptability of licehSing trade secrets. "Ad-
kins' claim ... raises the question whether, and to what extent, the kateS
may protect the owners of unpatented inventions *he are willing to dis-
close their idea§ to thantifattuterS only upon payment Of royalties.""
Looking to the future the Court added:
6? Stanley V. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 673, 221 P.2d 73, 84
(1950). Accord, Cal. Civ. Code g 980(b) (West 1954), which proVides that "the inventor
or proprietor of any invention or design . . . haS an exchiiive ownership thereiii . .
51 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
52
 International News Serv. v. Associated press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissent-
ing opinion), quoted in 46 Cal. 2d at 731, 299 P.2d at 265.
58 Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 791-92, 256 P.2d 947, 957 (1953).
54 International Salt Co. v. United States 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
55
 Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942), held that under such
circumstances courts may appropriately withhold their aid.
58
 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
157
 Lear, Itie. V. AdkinS, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
58
 Id. at 674.
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[O]ur decision today will, of course, require the state courts to
reconsider the theoretical basis of their decisions enforcing
the contractual rights of inventors and it is impossible to pre-
dict the extent to which this re-evaluation may revolutionize
the law of any particular state in this regard ... [I]ndeed, on
remand, the California courts may well reconcile the compet-
ing demands of patent and contract law in a way which would
not warrant further review in this Court."
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Lear on the basis of his
opinions in Sears and Carnpco, observed that the only authorized mo-
nopolies were those obtained from the Patent Office under the exacting
standards of the patent laws. He stated:
One who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it secret if
he wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled
inventors" do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather
disclose them, in return for contractual payments run counter
to the plan of our patent laws . . ."
It is probable that abolition of the patent licensee estoppel doc-
trine will result in the more frequent licensing of ideas as trade secrets.
To the extent that such licensing operates to chill competition and the
free exchange of ideas, the continued existence of licensee estoppel
is desireablé. Moreover, considering the unsettled nature of the law
regarding trade secrets, the enforceability of such agreements is in
doubt, thus seriously weakening the reliance of the parties on the
contract.'
IV. THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE ABOLITION OF
LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
The holding in Lear to abolish licensee estoppel may be supported
on several grounds. Perhaps most significant is the predominance of
the public interest in the free competition of ideas over the private
property interest of the patentee-inventor in his idea.' This predom-
inance is clear from the fact that the patent grants only a limited
monopoly of specific duration. Recognizing this priority of interests,
abolition of licensee estoppel is in the public interest to the extent that
it encourages the challenging of invalid patents, thus preserving the
free exchange of ideas whiCh are not the proper basis of Valid patents."
Id. at 675.
60 Id. at 677.
61 Treece, Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 525,
530 (1967),
Mereoid Corp, v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) ; Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc„ 339 U.S. 827, 837 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
The dissenter, justice Douglas, also noted that Katzinger, MacGregor, and Scott "put
the protection of the public interest in free enterprise above reward to the patentee."
Id, at 839.
63 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; 'Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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Aside from preservation of this basic policy, the public also benefit as
consumers in that the additional cost of the patent license will no longer
be a component of the price of the product."
It is established that the promotion of science and the useful arts,
a primary objective of the patent laws, is frustrated by licensing pro-
visions which prevent the parties from challenging the validity of the
patent. Equally clear is that such provisions, which usually require
the licensee to cease manufacturing the product if he repudiates the
agreement, are inconsistent with the policy of the Sherman Act of
preserving free competition. Similarly, the doctrine of licensee estoppel
violates these policies. Thus, the licensee operating under an invalid
patent has no alternative but to cease manufacuring the product or
continue manufacturing under the invalid patent—neither of which
are in the public interest.
If the license agreement is based on an application for a patent
(as in Lear) rather than on an issued patent, the doctrine of licensee
estoppel effectively extends the patent monopoly beyond 17 years, in
contravention of the patent and antitrust laws." For example, Adkins
had perfected his invention and licensed Lear to use it at least five
years before he was issued a patent. That patent, of course, entitled
him to a 17-year monopoly; thus, had he been able to rely on licensee
estoppel, he would have been allowed a monopoly of 22 years duration,
during which time the licensee would have been estopped from con-
testing the validity of the patent.
Another argument against the doctrine of licensee estoppel is the
fact that the Patent Office utilizes an ex parte administrative procedure
in deciding whether to grant patents, whereas judicial scrutiny of the
validity of patents would better serve the public interest, because courts
require a higher standard for patentability and have greater access
to the evidence of prior-art than does the Patent Office." Important
too is the adversary nature of judicial proceedings which creates a
greater depth of analysis.
Finally, the patent-licensor, absent the doctrine of licensee
estoppel, is not without other remedies to protect both his patent and
his benefits from the licensing agreement. The licensor may bring an
action for the enforcement of the agreement (that is, for royalties)
or he may sue for infringement of patent rights. Either of these rem-
edies favors the patent-licensor because the licensee runs the risk
not only of actual damages, but of punitive damages as well, both of
which may exceed the royalties.
64
 The United States, in its brief as amicus curiae, contended that royalties paid on
invalid patents are passed on by price increases to the consumer; and if the consumer is
the United States, the royalty payments are borne by the taxpayer. Possibly this argument
is fallacious. Indeed there is no evidence that Lear reduced its prices upon termination of
payment of royalties in 1959. Royalties saved in the future by proof of invalidity will
most likely end up in corporate coffers rather than in consumers' pockets. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, 6, & 9, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
65
 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
88 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
On remand in Lear, the California Supreme Court will have to
decide whether state . courts can protect the owners of unpatented
inventions (in effect granting them a monopoly) on the basis of con-
tract law without violating federal policy expressed in the patent and
antitrust laws.
Should Adkins' patent be found valid, it is likely that the original
jury verdict of nine years ago will be reinstated. However, should
the patent be found invalid, it would not necessarily follow that the
license agreement should be found void, because Adkins' "know-how"
(that is, his ability to implement his invention to enable Lear to
manufacture), which was developed simultaneously with the gyroscope
and enabled Lear to put his ideas into practice, could be considered
valuable and sufficient consideration. In addition it could be ruled
that both parties' lack of knowledge as to the applicability of the doctrine
of licensee estoppel was a mutual mistake, thus leaving the contract
in tact.°7 Furthermore, it is possible that the good faith of the parties
will be considered; thus, if Lear was looking for a way out of its
contractual obligation and was merely using patent validity as a
vehicle, this could be a lack of good faith which would effect the con-
tract's validity.
One final argument which Adkins advanced and the Court re-
jected was that the decision in Lear should not be retroactive; that is,
all licensees who bound themselves to a patent license prior to the
time the Lear decision was handed down should not be able to chal-
lenge the validity of the patents under which they hold licenses. The
Court felt that the estoppel principle had been so eroded prior to its
decision in Lear that no patent-licensor could have relied on the
doctrine's vitality in bargaining with the licensee, and hence no serious
injury would be incurred by making the decision retroactive."
One troublesome aspect of the Lear case remains, that is, the cor-
rect decision appears to have been made at the expense of Adkins."
The Court in Lear seemed to recognize that while the decision fur-
thered the public policy supporting the free competition of ideas and
the promotion of the useful arts, nonetheless, Adkins suffered an in-
justice. The Court noted that from the outset Lear gained immediate
access to ideas (in return for its promise to pay satisfactory compen-
sation) that it would not otherwise have gained until the Patent Office
published the details in 1960. Thus, during the lengthy period in
which Adkins was attempting to obtain a patent, Lear gained an
important benefit (and an 8-year headstart on the rest of the jet air-
67 A. Corbin, Contracts § 608 (1963).
68 395 U.S. at 674 n. 19 (1969).
66 The "decent public burial" of the doctrine of licensee estoppel may not be totally
at the expense of Adkins. On remand that patent may be determined valid and the
original jury verdict reinstated, but to the extent that 8 years of litigation has drawn upon
the time, resources and energy of Adkins, it was at his expense.
529
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
craft industry) not generally obtained by the typical licensee." The
Court again implied this when it stated that "the equities supporting
Adkins' position are somewhat more appealing than those supporting
the typical licensor." 71
 However, despite the inequitable nature of the
result, the decision has had the salutary effect of settling the confusion
and conflict among state and federal courts concerning the status of
the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
JoFig M. HURLEY,
70 395 U.S. at 671 (1969).
11 Id, at 67 - 73.
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